A failed node means a site visit
There is no path to recover a site remotely, so a two-hour fix becomes a two-day round trip and a production interruption.
Dozens of small sites, intermittent connectivity, and nobody on site who can debug a node.
Sites are numerous and thinly staffed. Connectivity is unreliable by nature, hardware is exposed to environment and to power that is not clean, and the person nearest the equipment is usually a machine operator rather than an engineer.
K3s or KubeVirt at the edge with central fleet management, an out-of-band path that survives the data plane, offline-tolerant updates, and recovery that does not need a truck roll.
If two or three of these describe your environment, the audit is worth the money. If all four do, it is overdue.
There is no path to recover a site remotely, so a two-hour fix becomes a two-day round trip and a production interruption.
Sites were installed over years by different people. Nobody can say which of them differ from the reference, or in what way.
Remote access depends on the link that also carries production traffic, so when that link has a problem, so does your ability to see it.
An update that assumes a stable link bricks sites when the link drops mid-transfer, and rollback is a truck roll.
Sequenced so that stopping after any phase leaves you better off rather than stranded mid-migration.
Give every site out-of-band access that does not depend on the production link, so a link failure does not remove your ability to diagnose it.
A management path that survives a data-plane outage, tested by deliberately breaking the data plane.
Bring every site onto a declared configuration and report the ones that deviate, rather than discovering them one outage at a time.
Fleet drift detected and reported centrally, with a remediation path that does not require visiting.
Stage updates locally, apply them atomically, and keep the previous version so a failed update is an automatic revert rather than a site visit.
An update that survives a link drop mid-transfer, demonstrated with the link actually dropped.
Ensure a site can return itself to a known good state — including after a power event — without anyone on site.
Remote node recovery without a site visit, tested against a real power interruption.
Each discipline has its own page with the technology stack, the acceptance criteria and an explicit scope boundary.
The layer that holds every other cluster type together: fleets that deploy the same way everywhere, DR that has been rehearsed, and security that produces evidence.
Karmada · Rancher Fleet · Argo CD ApplicationSet · Cluster APIFirewall pairs that actually fail over on purpose, switch stacks and MLAG pairs that neither loop nor blackhole when a member dies, and routers whose routing convergence you have measured instead of assumed.
Arista EOS · Cumulus Linux · SONiC · Cisco NX-OS (vPC)Twenty machines arrive. In fifteen minutes each they are identical, provisioned from Git, and ready to join a cluster — with nobody logging in by hand.
PXE / iPXE · Debian Preseed · Kickstart · MAASLicence costs that do not triple every renewal. Proxmox VE, Ceph, KubeVirt and OpenStack, with a migration plan that includes a tested way back.
Proxmox VE 8.x · XCP-ng · oVirt / OLVM · KVM + libvirt with manual management2.8s · measured stateful failover
Read the engagement → Retail chain · North America4 · WAN links per site, all in active use
Read the engagement → Telecommunications software · Global23 · clusters under one declarative control plane
Read the engagement →Every case in this library is a representative engagement, written from our delivery patterns and marked as such. We do not present unnamed work as a named customer.
These are the numbers we put in the delivery report. If we cannot measure it, we do not promise it.
Every vendor says yes to everything. Here is where our answer is no, or where someone else needs to be in the room. If this list looks wrong for your situation, tell us — we would rather argue about scope before the contract than after.
OT, PLC and industrial control system work
We build the IT layer beside the plant network. Control systems, safety functions and their certification are a different discipline with different rules.
Carrier circuits, cellular plans and site connectivity contracts
We design around what the link does. Ordering and holding the circuit is a commercial relationship with a carrier.
Physical installation, environmental and electrical work
Racking, power and cooling at remote sites needs a local trade. We will specify and verify rather than pretend to install.
Fleet architecture, out-of-band design, update mechanism and remote recovery
Including the failure tests that prove it works from the head office.
Yes, and it changes the design rather than being an edge case. Read-only boot media, atomic updates, and a recovery path that assumes an unclean shutdown, tested against an actual power cut.
That is the point of the out-of-band path. We will be explicit about what can be done remotely and what genuinely needs someone on site, so the expectation is set before an incident rather than during one.
By design, not by improvisation. The site holds its last known good state, buffers what it can, and reconciles when the link returns. The reconciliation behaviour is tested before deployment, not discovered afterwards.
Thirty minutes, no slides. Bring the awkward constraint — that is usually the interesting part.